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Introduction
General Background 
The current literature on organic food focuses 
solely on the growth it has seen from the consumer 
side of the market. Less research focus is directed 
at the production side of the organic food market. 
It is essential to examine what is meant by the term 
organic. The Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 
established the official definition of organic when 
they wrote in the law that any agricultural product 
sold as organic must “Have been produced and 
handled without the use of synthetic 
chemicals…not to be produced on land to which 
any prohibited substances, including synthetic 
chemicals have been applied during the 3 years 
immediately preceding the harvest of the 
agricultural products; and be produced and 
handled in compliance with an organic plan agreed 
to by the producer and handler of such product 
and the certifying agent” (1990). 
There is a reimbursement program in place called 
the National Organic Certification Cost Share 
Program, which can reimburse up to 75 percent of 
certification costs and which has been in place in its 
most current form since 2009 (AMS). Benefits of 
this Cost Share program are not directed at a farm 
in the initial stages of transitioning to organic and 
facing the three-year transition period where they 
must incur costs without being able to sell their 
products under the organic label and earn no price 
premium during this time. 
Literature Review
Theoretical Insights
Barriers to entry remains vital in examining the 
efficiency in all sorts of markets. When a market is 
perfectly competitive, it will attract entry into that 
market as more and more firms hope to capture the 
profit. This continues until the point where enough 
firms enter the market so that there is no longer any 
profit that is abled to be captured. Incumbent firms 
in a market thus have an incentive to construct 
barriers to entry so that fewer firms are able to enter 
the market and capture the incumbent firm’s profits. 
The cost of a barrier to entry, such as licensing of 
labeling, is relatively small for the firm compared to 
the profits they can maintain once labeled or 
licensed. 
Gunthram (2004) describes how the steps to 
becoming certified organic are barriers to entry that 
create rents for organic producers precisely because 
the certification process imposes an artificial scarcity 
of certified organic food based on USDA regulations. 
Since not all farmers can afford to have their land 
and production methods certified organic, this leads 
to a shortage of food items bearing the official USDA 
Certified Organic seal while demand for these items 
only grows. This artificial scarcity has allowed the 
profit margins of organic producers to remain so high 
for so long. A closer examination of economic rents 
illustrates how applicable this theory is in the realm 
of organic food. In his seminal work George Stigler 
elucidated many of these ideas most clearly when he 
wrote that industries with the ability to influence 
regulation strive to have “regulatory policy…be so 
fashioned as to retard the rate of growth of new 
firms” (Stigler 1971). 
Data
Preliminary Findings
In this study I am utilizing two data sets and 
combining them in my analysis. The first set comes 
from the USDA National Agricultural Statistics 
Service’s Quick Stats database. The second set of 
data comes from the USDA’s public Report to 
Congress on the National Organic Certification Cost 
Share Program, which is produced yearly. The 
national level data indicates that despite the length 
of time the program has now been in place, both 
the number of operations utilizing the cost share 
program and the total funds utilized are just starting 
to be back around and slightly exceed levels from 
when the program started.
National level data on the number of organic 
operations and organic acres over the last decade 
offer an unclear picture about the effectiveness of 
the National Organic Certification Cost Share 
Program in inducing more farmers to transition to 
organic since it subsidizes those farmers who are 
already certified. This data leads to the question of 
whether or not the NOCCSP is functioning as a 
barrier to entry. 
Next Steps
Proceeding with the next steps
After analyzing state level data on the number 
of farms certified organic, transitioning to 
organic, and the amount of NOCCSP funds 
disbursed and utilized by the states, I will 
formalize my economic model and proceed to 
perform ordinary least squares regression. In 
my analysis I will test the relationship between 
not only the number of organic farms and the 
funds from the NOCCSP, but also the 
relationship between certified organic acreage 
and funds from the NOCCSP. 
In my econometric analysis, I will be sure to 
test for heteroskedasticity in my model to 
ensure estimates from the regression are not 
biased. 
My goal is that the results from this study will 
help to inform better public policy surrounding 
farming and in particular organic farming. One 
area I am most interested in a policy impact is 
policy development that has the potential to 
influence a traditional farmer whether or not 
to take the first step in the process to convert 
to organic. 
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